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TO:	Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
FROM:	Controlling DoD Organization: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Attn: FOR-OT-UT, Washington, DC 20310.
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31 May 1979 per DoDD 5200.10 document marking; Adjutant General's Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980	

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

120-523

INDEXED

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (26 Sep 67) FOR OT RD-670481

3 October 1967

SUBJECT: ~~Operational Report~~ (6) Lessons Learned, Headquarters,
135th Military Intelligence Group (u) - (S)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

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HEADQUARTERS
135th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP
APO 96243

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AVGJ-000

4 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

TO: Commanding Officer
525th Military Intelligence Group
ATTN: AVGJ-MO
APO US Forces 96307

(U) The following Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967 is submitted in accordance with the provisions of USARV Regulation 870-2, dated 19 July 1966:

SECTION I
Significant Organization Activities

(C) During the reporting period, 1 February 1967 - 30 April 1967, the 135th Military Intelligence Group continued to support J2 MACV and US Army Vietnam with counterintelligence support aimed at the detection, investigation, exploitation and/or neutralization of hostile and foreign intelligence activities within the Republic of Vietnam. Counterintelligence area coverage was maintained throughout the 44 provinces and Capital Special Zone during the entire quarter, with the organization engaged in operational activities for a total of 89 days. Personnel of the Group continued to advise and assist Military Security Service counterparts at all levels. Counterintelligence support to Headquarters MACV was maintained throughout the period. An expanded Technical Support Branch enabled this organization to provide better and more responsive technical services in the form of CI inspections and surveys, DAME and DASE analysis, photographic service, and audio/visual technical intelligence. In addition, the Group continued to provide security support to all major Army commands operating in the Republic of Vietnam, with special emphasis placed on the reporting and investigation of SAEDA cases; during the period, three developed SAEDA cases were closed. A total of 254 Personnel Security Investigations were closed, 270 security interviews and 2104 Local Agency Checks were processed, and 2368 security-related reports were published. The Missing/Captured Personnel Intelligence Program monitored developments concerning captured US and Free World military and civilian personnel. During the period, two US military personnel and two US civilian personnel were released by the Viet Cong and returned safely to US control.

GROUP-4

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(C) On 4 February 1967, the Group completed its 734-page Counter-intelligence Estimate which contained results and projections in the area of counterintelligence for the last quarter of calendar year 1966. The CI Estimate was compiled from intelligence collected from four unilateral and nine bilateral operations, and from intensive liaison with US and RVN military and civilian agencies and operational field elements. Major areas of counterintelligence coverage during the period were as follows: investigation of RVN government shake-up arising from the dismissal of high-level RVN authorities, notably Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Huu Co; analysis of possible steps to be taken by the RVN government if US demands, policies or agreements come in conflict with Vietnamese interests; study of recruitment of relatives of Viet Cong who live in RVN-controlled areas; monitoring of Viet Cong, student, labor and political activities, with particular emphasis on the 1967 Hamlet Elections and the drafting of the RVN Constitution; conduct of Operation RELAX, which concerns possible contact of US military personnel with foreign members of the International Control Commission; exploitation of personalities identified through films and documents captured from the enemy during Operation JUNCTION CITY; defection in place of Viet Cong infrastructure agents who have penetrated ARVN channels, for utilization as double agents; analysis of Viet Cong intentions against the 1967 Hamlet Elections; and study of possible defection of US and RVN military personnel through programs initiated by VC and NVA intelligence.

(C) In connection with these and other areas of counterintelligence interest, this organization completed 61 Special Intelligence Requirement CI investigations, published and forwarded 1814 Information Reports and 871 Agent Reports, and completed 3597 separate file screenings. A total of 64 counterintelligence investigations are currently in progress. CI file checks conducted totaled 302. The Reproduction Section produced 273,638 copied impressions from operational and administrative references. In addition, this organization completed 25 counterintelligence inspections and surveys, 78 technical inspections, and 21 counterintelligence evaluations.

(C) The Group continued to provide CI support, in the form of advisors to MBS security elements, to the combined US-ARVN Operation FAIRFAX. Basic concept of this operation is to search and clear three districts of Gia Dinh Province adjacent to the Saigon area of Viet Cong guerilla, main force and infrastructure personnel. The plan to clear a hamlet begins with selection of targets and allocation of suitably-equipped units to accomplish the mission by the US and RVN infantry commanders and the District Chief. The tactical elements seal off the selected hamlet during the hours of darkness, and at dawn the MBS teams move into the hamlet with blacklists prepared by MACV and augmented with information gathered during the actual conduct of operations. House to house searches and terrain sweeps are executed to gather up suspects, who are dispatched to the interrogation points for further questioning.

(C) Organization of the Group has not changed significantly. At the beginning of the reporting quarter, there were a total of 356 personnel assigned; at the close, 358, including 80 officers, 38 warrant officers,

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and 240 enlisted men. This is the first time since December 1965 that unit strength has stabilized over a period of time. This trend reflects the completion of augmentation steps from Detachment to Company to Group, accomplished during the 12 months of calendar year 1966. A total of 18 personnel are assigned on temporary duty to provide operational support to field elements. During the period, 62 assigned personnel were rotated and 53 replacements arrived.

(C) 135th Military Intelligence Group MTOE 30-500D (C), consolidating information on organization, personnel and equipment of Company B, 519th Military Intelligence Bn (Fld A) and the 135th MI Group, and modified for present operational conditions in Vietnam, was redrafted and resubmitted to higher headquarters on 13 April 1967 in accordance with guidance furnished by G2, USARV relating to revision of the previously-existing MTOE in the areas of language requirements and format.

(U) On 9 February 1967, the USARPAC Inspector General conducted an inspection of Intelligence Contingency Fund and ICF Property. The formal inspection report received from USARPAC indicated only a few very minor discrepancies in ICF accounting procedures.

(U) A training program implementing USARV Regulation 350-1, Subject: Education and Training was initiated 28 January 1967 to cover individual soldiering training subjects. Training subjects presented included: Technical Intelligence, SAEDA, Military Justice, Code of Conduct, Arms Familiarization and practice firing, Safety, and Safeguarding Defense Information. Attendance records maintained at this Headquarters indicate an attendance rate of close to 100 percent. Some difficulty has been encountered in completing training requirements for the field elements, due to their scattered disposition, size, and operational priorities. During the reporting period, the Group engaged in training activities for a total of 12 days.

SECTION II

Part 1

Observations - Lessons Learned

Personnel

Item (U): Utilization of Interpreter/Translators on Field Trips

Discussion (U): During discussions with counterparts on field trips to Field Offices and Resident Offices, it is extremely helpful to have an interpreter/translator to insure points covered are properly understood by all parties. It is unwise to rely on an interpreter/translator at the locality visited since previous obligations, normal duties and unforeseen circumstances often require withdrawal of the interpreter from the conversation.

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Observation (U): Interpreter/translators should accompany Headquarters personnel during trips to the field.

Item (U): Personnel Security and Indigenous Employees

Discussion (C): Many of the indigenous employees hired by MACV activities for menial or unattractive tasks are very young (14-18 years of age). They do not have RVN government identification cards. Because of their youth, it is difficult for MSS to conduct background investigations. In addition, younger persons are more readily proselyted by the Viet Cong than older, more mature persons with family obligations.

Observation (U): MACV activities should hire older, more mature persons rather than young people for employment in order to enhance the security of their installations.

Operations

Item (C): Assignment of US Counterintelligence Advisors and MSS Teams in Conjunction with US/ARVN Combat Infantry Units in Search and Clear Operations

Discussion (C): Some of the problem areas encountered during Operation FAIRFAX, outlined in Section I, above, materialized during the early stages of the operation. MSS teams were fielded too quickly and did not fully understand their mission in the operation. Most MSS team chiefs were changed too frequently, negating essential experience gained. Although the US advisor's role was solely to advise, in many cases he was required to act as the team chief because of the constant MSS personnel rotations. The infantry battalions failed to include MSS in the planning phase of an operation, with the result that the MSS teams could never fully prepare for the operation. An element missing from most operations was coordination between participating units. The US CI advisor, in most cases, had to attend planning sessions with the battalion S2 and S3 so that MSS could be kept informed. During an actual hamlet clearing, the advisor constantly had to be aware of all activities conducted by MSS. Initially, MSS teams were not overly concerned with the tactical side of an operation, and, in some cases, combat intelligence information that could have been obtained during initial interrogation of suspects was not exploited until the suspect was processed through the interrogation centers in the rear area.

Observation (C): During the course of Operation FAIRFAX, most of the problem areas have been resolved and an improved system of teamwork between all participating units has been developed. The operational effectiveness of the MSS team depends to a great extent on the relationship that exists between the US CI advisor and the MSS team chief. The team chiefs, in most cases, will accept judgement and advice offered if they respect the ability and professional competence of the US CI advisor. For this reason

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it is extremely important that young, energetic CI trained officers with a basic infantry background be considered for CI advisory roles. They should have a working knowledge of map reading, village searching techniques, interrogation, guerrilla warfare, combat intelligence and infantry tactics. It is highly desirable that they have some in-country experience. This enables them to have a basic understanding of MSS, its functioning characteristics, and its capabilities.

One of the more important assets of US CI advisor has is his Vietnamese interpreter. To insure continuity and control, the interpreter should be assigned from the advisor's parent unit. In most cases where MSS has supplied interpreters, they were rotated frequently and thus their effectiveness as a catalyst for establishing rapport between US and MSS counterparts was limited.

During the course of Operation FAIRFAX, advisors and MSS teams assigned to US infantry battalions received excellent logistical support; however, those assigned to ARVN infantry units operating independently lived primarily off the economy and required support from the parent unit. Although the advisor receives necessary logistical support from US infantry units, experience indicates that upon initial assignment to an MSS team, the following items should be carried by the advisor:

CLOTHING:

Fatigues, 4 sets	Underwear, 5 sets
Fatigue cap, 1	Socks, 4 pr
Jungle boots, 2 pr	Handkerchiefs, 5
Belt, 1	Shower clogs, 1 pr

TOILET ARTICLES:

Package razor blades, 1	Soap, 5 bars
Shaving cream, 1 can	Towels, 4
Toothbrush, 1	Washcloth, 1
Toothpaste, 1 can	Mirror, small, 1
Fingernail clipper	Tweezers, 1 pr

FIELD EQUIPMENT:

Helmet, steel, 1	Notebook
Protective vest	Pen
Complete web gear	Writing Paper
Canteens, 2	Salt tablets
Bayonet, 1	Water purification pills
Ammo clips, 8	Malaria pills
Poncho, 1	Mosquito bar
Cot, 1	C Rations
Flashlight	First aid kit
Maps of area	2,500SVN and \$30 MPC

Item (C): Debriefing of Returning US and Free World Captured Personnel

Discussion (C): At the present time, USARPAC Regulation 600-15, subject: Processing of Returned, Exchanged or Captured US Army Personnel Pacific, dated 15 December 1966, requires that all returnees who have been absent in

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excess of 30 days be evacuated through medical channels from RVN to Okinawa. On 28 February 1967, four Special Agents from the 135th MI Group were assigned to debrief and escort two US military personnel released to US control in the RVN. Because of delays for medical examinations and travel arrangements, only six hours were available for in-country debriefing. Upon arrival at Okinawa, the debriefing function was assumed by the 441st MI Detachment. The 135th MI Group Special Agents and already-obtained information were not further utilized. The 135th MI Group was provided tape recordings of the 441st MID debriefing, but they proved inaudible.

Observation (C): Inadequate debriefing time in the RVN prevented the 135th MI Group debriefing team from obtaining perishable tactical order of battle and other information; specifically, sufficient data to pinpoint the location of the Viet Cong prison camp where other US prisoners were being detained. Since determining the exact location of a VC prison camp is extremely difficult, it should take priority over all other requirements. This task can only be accomplished in the RVN where the applicable maps, aerial photos and area specialists are available for debriefing returnees while their memories are still clear.

Item (U): Format for Local Agency Checks

Discussion (C): The various military intelligence agencies in the Saigon area frequently request name traces from other US and RVN agencies. Each agency normally has its own specific form for a name trace, typed or printed in either English or Vietnamese. This results in a duplication of typing effort and time.

Observation (U): So many different forms are used that, inevitably, when local agency checks are requested of Vietnamese agencies, one form is filled out by the requesting agency and another by the Vietnamese agency doing the checking.

Item (U): Proper Writing of Vietnamese Names

Discussion (U): Many lead sheets are received from CONUS in which the order of writing Vietnamese names has been reversed to conform to the manner of writing American names. This causes confusion and sometimes results in invalid investigative results.

Observation (U): It is necessary that all personnel concerned with personnel security investigations of Vietnamese nationals be aware of the correct sequence for writing Vietnamese names. When copies of DD Form 398 have been forwarded with the lead sheet, it has been possible for investigative personnel to determine the proper name.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
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Intelligence

Item (U): Collation of Infrastructure Data

Discussion (C): MSS desires that the date and place of acquisition of information and names of parents be provided when reference is made to infrastructure personalities. Without this information, collation of critical information is impossible and leads to frequently inconclusive investigation.

Observation (C): Date and place of information and parental data should be provided with infrastructure names so that information may be collated with available intelligence data.

Item (C): Spotting Potential Sources who Speak English

Discussion (C): It has been determined that normal liaison contacts, both official and social, do not provide the opportunity to spot potential English-speaking sources. Most persons contacted cannot be used as sources because they are usually ARVN or GVN employees.

Observation (C): Attendance at English classes conducted for Vietnamese can provide opportunities to spot potential sources who are not ARVN or GVN employees.

Logistics

Item (U): Deterioration of Polygraph Equipment and Supplies

Discussion (U): In the past year, new transistorized polygraph sets have malfunctioned in several ways which are apparently the result of extended exposure to the hot, humid climate of the RVN. The sets are powered by rechargeable nickel-cadmium batteries which are designed to last indefinitely, but which, in fact, deteriorate and break down completely in less than one year. Despite repeated cleaning and drying, faceplates and other critical components of the equipment have become pitted and corroded. Polygraph chart paper has become water-logged from the absorption of moisture from the air. This has caused repeated jamming of equipment during use.

Observation (U): Polygraph equipment supplies should be stored and used in air conditioned facilities wherever possible. Polygraph equipment is much too costly and delicate to be continuously exposed to extremes in climate which cause it to become unreliable and operationally useless.

Item (U): Corrosion of Brushed Metal Surfaces

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Discussion (U): Some brushed or polished metal surfaces, such as typewriter scales and safe handles, corrode rapidly, especially when their location or function requires that they be touched or handled frequently. A candle, rubbed over these surfaces, will provide a protective surface of wax which is easily applied or removed.

Observation (U): Given proper cleaning and coating, most metal surfaces will survive the climate of Vietnam.

SECTION II Part 2 Recommendations

1. (C) That the 155th Military Intelligence Group continue supporting Operation FAIRFAX. This support will enhance the intelligence aspects of the operation, and will stress the importance of intelligence to tactical units in the field.


2. (C) That all returning US and Free World Captured Personnel be held in RVN for a period of at least 10 days in order to obtain first hand perishable intelligence through local debriefing. Further, that the debriefing team originally assigned to a returnee remain with him until all debriefing requirements are satisfied. Further, that returnees be evacuated directly to CONUS following their 10-day debriefing and medical processing as no purpose is served in dispatching them to Okinawa if those requirements can be met in Vietnam.

3. (U) That agencies requesting investigative action on Vietnamese nationals be made aware of the correct sequence of writing Vietnamese names: father's or family name, middle name(s), and given name. Further, that DD Form 398 be forwarded with copies of lead sheets to eliminate all possibility of error.

4. (U) That the standardized, bi-lingual trace form attached as Inclosure 1 be procured for mutual use by US and RVN intelligence and investigative agencies.

5. (U) That polygraph equipment and supplies be stored in air conditioned facilities.

1 Incl
Encl LAC Form


PAUL GOODMAN
Colonel, AIS
Commanding

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AVGJ-HOADM (4 May 67)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U), (135th Military Intelligence Group, APO 96243)

HEADQUARTERS, 525th Military Intelligence Group, APO 96307, 13 June 1967

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVC-DH,
APO 96307

1. (U) This command concurs with the recommendations set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, 4 and 5, Part 2, Section II of subject report.
2. (C) Reference paragraph 3, Part 2, Section II, recommend that CI Division make widest distribution of this information, to include USAINTC.
3. (U) Sensitive items of equipment and supplies such as polygraph equipment should always be stored in climatic controlled areas. Storage in such areas will help to insure cleaner equipment and trouble free operations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


W. A. FREEMAN
LTC, AIS
Adjutant

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AVHGC-DST (4 May 67) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 111

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1967 from Headquarters, 135th Military Intelligence Group as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning personnel security and indigenous employees, section II, part I: RVN labor laws, which are observed by US Forces hiring local nationals, prohibit employment of anyone under 16 years of age. From a management effectiveness standpoint, employment should be based on ability to do a job without imposing arbitrary age restrictions. Whether employment of more mature person with family obligations would enhance the security of an installation is unknown; however, it would appear that our objective of teaching and influencing Vietnamese nationals is more effective with younger people, and presumably an unemployed young person would be more susceptible to Viet Cong recruiting than one who is employed. The salubrious effect of giving Vietnamese youths gainful employment outweighs the difficulties of background investigations. It is believed that the risks of hiring youths is no greater than those inherent in hiring Hoi Chanhs.

b. Reference item concerning debriefing of returning US and Free World captured personnel, section II, part I and section II, part 2, paragraph 2: All debriefing procedures can be conducted on a more thorough and timely basis within Vietnam, physical and psychological condition of the individual permitting. Facilities for debriefing are adequate in RVN and debriefing personnel, by virtue of their direct knowledge of the tactical and intelligence situation, are in a position to obtain valuable tactical information and possibly exploitable leads concerning other PW's on a more expeditious basis. Recommend USARPAC consider the recommendation as stated in section II, part 2.

c. Reference item concerning format for local agency checks, section II, part I and paragraph 4, section II, part 2: Unless a uniform trace form is utilized in submitting local agency checks, duplication and possible omission of available information may result. It has been recommended to MACV the recommended bi-lingual trace form submitted as Inclosure 1 to the ORLL be studied and a standard form be developed for use by US and RVN intelligence and investigative agencies.

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d. Reference item concerning the correct sequence in writing Vietnamese names, section II, part 2: A letter is being forwarded by this headquarters to the intelligence command in CONUS which will explicitly outline the correct sequence for including Vietnamese names on lead sheets to RVN.

e. Reference item concerning deterioration of polygraph equipment, section II, part I: Concur. Maximum protection against local climatic conditions for sensitive, sophisticated electronic gear will improve performance and increase life expectancy of equipment. Commercial equipment is usually not ruggedized for field operations and this equipment is particularly vulnerable to dust, heat and humidity.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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nc


E. L. KENNEDY
CPT, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

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GPOP-DT(4 May 67) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65), HQ 135th MI Gp

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 8 AUG 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs in the
report as indorsed subject to the following comments:

a. Reference paragraph 2a, 2d Indorsement. Because RVN labor laws prohibit employment of anyone under 16 years of age and since US Forces observe this law in hiring local nationals, neither difficulties in conducting background investigations nor salubrious effects are a point of consideration in this matter; U.S. Forces in Vietnam should continuously endeavor to comply with laws and customs of the host government or to seek legal changes which would result in mutual benefit to the host government and U.S. Forces.

b. Reference paragraph 2b, 2d Indorsement. The subject of retention of returnees in RVN is a matter of separate action currently being conducted between this headquarters and USARV. At this time, it is likely that this headquarters will concur in principle with the recommendation contained in Section II, part 2, paragraph 2 of subject report.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

G. L. McMullin
G. L. McMULLIN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

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XIN SƯU-TRA VÂN-KHÔ (Request for Name Check)				
Cơ Quan Xin Sưu-Tra (Requesting Agency)	REGION V, 135TH MI GROUP			
Họ và Tên (Name)	TAN GIA LAP			
Ngày và Nơi Sinh (D&POB)	8/12/1943, Cholon			
Con của Ông (Father)	Tan van Ngoc			
Con của Bà (Mother)	Vo thi Dam			
Căn Cứ (ID No.)	322240			
Cấp Tại (Issued by)	5th Precinct, Cholon			
Ngày (Date)	3/3/1961			
Địa Chỉ (Address)	106/24/32 Ton That Hiep, Saigon			
Đơn Vị (Unit)				
Cấp Đốc (Rank)				
Số Quân (Svc No.)				
Những Tin Tức Khác (Other)	Interpreter at MSS/CSZ, OAT			
Cơ Quan Mở Cuộc Sưu-Tra (Agencies to be Checked)				
Ngày (Date)	Cơ Quan (Agency)	Không Tên (No Record)	Cơ Tên, Không Vết-Tích (No Derogatory)	Có Vết Tích Như (Info as Follows)
3/4/67	MSA	✓		
3/4/67	SMP	✓		
3/5/67	DBNP	✓		

Inlosure 1 to Opnl Rpt qtrly Pd Ending 30 Apr 67

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